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A number of authors have recently argued that globalization has gone too far, and
that free capital mobility has created a highly unstable international financial system.
Krugman (1999, p. 74), for instance, has maintained: “[S]ooner or later we will have to turn
the clock at least part of the way back: to limit capital flows for countries that are
unsuitable for either currency unions or free floating.”  Discussions on the new
international financial architecture have focused on two type of controls on cross-border
capital movements: controls on capital outflows, perhaps similar to those that Malaysia
imposed in mid-1998, and controls on capital inflows, perhaps similar to those
implemented in Chile between 1991 and 1998.  While most economists continue to be
skeptical about the former, the idea of restricting capital inflows has grown in popularity.
For example, Joseph Stiglitz (1999), the World Bank’s Chief Economist, has said:
“Volatile markets are an inescapable reality.  Developing countries need to manage them.
They will have to consider policies that help stabilize the economy…These could include
sound bankruptcy laws and Chilean-style policies that put some limits on capital flows.”
This view has also been recently endorsed by Ito and Portes (1998) and Eichengreen
(1999), among others.
The idea of restricting capital mobility as a means of reducing macroeconomics
instability is not new in modern policy discussions.  In the 1970s James Tobin (1978)
argued that a global tax on foreign exchange transactions would reduce destabilizing
speculation in international financial markets.  In the  mid 1990s Tobin’s proposal was
discussed in the context of the devaluation of the British Pound and the Italian Lira.  Barry
Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz (1993), for example, argued that Tobin-taxes would
discourage short-term speculators from betting against major currencies.  However, it soon2
became evident that to be effective, Tobin-taxes would have to be implemented by all
countries simultaneously.  This made them technically and politically unfeasible.  Recent
discussions on the future of the international monetary system have tended to shy away
from grand and universal schemes, focusing instead on the merits of more modest
proposals aimed at restricting capital mobility in (some of) the emerging economies.
In this paper I review some evidence on capital controls, with some focus on Chile
as the leading example of where such controls have been widely acclaimed as effective.
The discussion deals with: capital controls and the sequencing of economic reform, the
measurement of the degree of capital mobility, the empirical evidence on the relationship
between capital mobility and economic performance, and the effectiveness of controls on
both capital outflows and inflows.  In Chile, I will discuss how controls on capital inflows
have affected the composition of capital flows, the behavior of exchange rates, and Chile's
monetary policy and macroeconomic instability.
Capital Controls and the Sequencing of Reform
For a long time economists have argued about the benefits of free capital mobility.
This discussion has been carried out at both theoretical and empirical levels.  Theoretically,
the question is whether the theorems on the gains from free trade in goods, extend to free
trade in financial capital. Maurice Obstfeld and Keneth Rogoff (1996), for example, have
provided persuasive theoretical arguments that support the existence of gains from
intertemporal trade, through a free international market for securities.  Jagdish Bhagwati
(1998) and Richard Cooper (1998), on the other hand, have argued that in a world with
imperfect information, free capital mobility is likely to amplify existing distortions, create3
situations of moral hazard, encourage excessive risk taking, and generate major and costly
crises.
At the practical policy level the debate has centered, not so much on whether capital
controls should be eliminated, but on when and how fast this should be done.  This
discussion has come to be known as the “sequencing and speed of reform debate” (James
Hanson 1995, Stanley Fischer 1998).   Early discussions on the sequencing of reform
focused on the order of liberalization of the current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments.  Ronald McKinnon (1973) argued that the opening of the capital account,
through the dismantling of capital controls, should be postponed until free trade in goods
was consolidated.  According to him, if the opposite sequencing were followed, excessive
capital inflows would result in a substantial real exchange rate appreciation, which, in turn,
would frustrate the attempt to open-up trade in goods.
With time, the sequencing debate extended to other markets, and by the late 1980s a
consensus of sorts had emerged.  Most authors agreed that major fiscal imbalances had to
be tackled first, and that a minimal degree of macroeconomic stability should be attained
very early on during the reform process.  Most analysts also agreed that the capital account
should only be liberalized once the domestic financial sector had been reformed, and once
the liberalization of trade in goods had become consolidated.   It was also agreed that an
effort should be made to ease labor markets regulations as early as possible in the reform
process.
During the 1990s, a number of authors argued that a successful sequencing required
establishing a sound banking system -- including effective prudential regulations --, before
restrictions on capital mobility were lifted. Mc Kinnon (1991) and McKinnon and Pill4
(1995) argued that, because of the moral hazard associated with the financial sector, capital
account liberalization should wait until the end of the reform episode.  In the aftermath of
the Mexican and East Asian crisis economists have become particularly aware of the need to
put in place, very early on in the reform process, a modern banking supervisory system.  As
Calvo (1998) has pointed out, the problem is that poorly regulated banks will intermediate
the inflows of capital in an inefficient – or even corrupt – way, increasing the probability
of a systemic financial crisis (See also, Rudi Dornbusch 1998, Graciela Kaminsky and
Carmen Reinhart 1999 and Frederic Mishkin, this issue).
Capital Controls, the “True” Extent of Capital Mobility and Economic Performance
Legal controls on capital mobility are not always translated into actual restrictions
on these movements.  In country after country the private sector has found ways of
getting around controls.  The simplest mechanisms are the overinvoicing of imports, the
underinvoicing of exports, and the mislabeling of the nature of the capital movement
(Garber 1998 discusses more sophisticated mechanisms).  The differences between the
legal and actual degree of capital mobility has affected economists’ ability to measure
the “true” degree of financial integration of particular countries, and has been at the
center of recent debates on the effectiveness of capital controls.  Some authors have
followed Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (1980), and have relied on the correlation
(or lack there off) between savings and investment as a measurement of the degree to
which capital markets in different countries are integrated.  Using this approach, Peter
Montiel (1994) concluded that in most developing countries, savings and investment
exhibited a rather low degree of correlation.  This, in turn, suggests that the “true” degree5
of capital mobility is much larger than what a simple analysis of legal restrictions would
indicate.  Other authors have concentrated on interest rate differentials in trying to
determine whether a particular country is actually integrated to world financial markets.
Using this methodology, Michael Dooley, Donald Mathieson and Liliana Rojas-Suarez
(1997) have found that the degree of “actual” capital mobility is almost always larger than
what the authorities had intended when imposing capital controls.
More recently, some authors have used information contained in the International
Monetary Fund’s Exchange Rate and Monetary Arrangements to construct indexes on
capital controls for a panel of countries.  Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli and Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferreti (1994), for example, constructed a dummy variable index of capital controls.
This indicator -- which takes a value of one when capital controls are in place and zero
otherwise -- was then used to analyze some of the political forces behind the imposition of
capital restrictions in a score of countries.  Dani Rodrik (1998) used a similar index to
investigate the effects of capital controls on growth, inflation and investment between 1979
and 1989.  His results suggest that, after controlling for other variables, capital restrictions
have no significant effects on macroeconomic performance.
A serious limitation of these IMF-based indexes, however, is that they are extremely
general and do not distinguish between different intensities of capital restrictions.
Moreover, they fail to distinguish between the type of flow that is being restricted, and they
ignore the fact that, as discussed above, legal restrictions are frequently circumvented.  For
example, according to this IMF-based indicator, Chile, Mexico and Brazil were subject to
the same degree of capital controls in 1992-1994.  In reality, however, the three cases were
extremely different.  While in Chile there were restrictions on short-term inflows, Mexico6
had (for all practical purposes) free capital mobility, and Brazil had in place an arcane array
of restrictions.  Montiel and Reinhart (1999) have combined IMF and country-specific
information to construct an index on the intensity of capital controls in 15 countries during
1990-96.  Although their index, which can take three values (0, 1 or 2) represent an
improvement over straight IMF indicators, it is still extremely general, and does not capture
the subtleties of actual capital restrictions.  As Rogoff (this issue) has argued, empirical
work aimed at understanding the relationship between trade in financial assets and
growth is in its infancy.  Progress in this area will require constructing indexes that are
able to adequately capture the “true” degree of capital mobility in different countries.
Controls on Capital Outflows
Controls on capital outflows have been advocated as a way of dealing with a
financial and currency crisis.  In assessing the effectiveness of controls on outflows it is
useful to distinguish between two type of controls. The first type corresponds to
“preventive controls.” These are imposed (or tightened) when a country is facing a severe
balance of payments deficit, but has not yet suffered a devaluation crisis.  These
preventive controls can take a number of forms, including taxes on funds remitted
abroad, dual exchange rates (with a more depreciated rate for capital account
transactions), and outright prohibition of funds’ transfers. The idea is that these measures
will help slow down the drainage of international reserves, giving the authorities the time
required to implement corrective policies, and fend-off speculators.
i
The empirical evidence suggests that this type of controls have been largely
ineffective.  When faced with the prospect of a major crisis, the private sector finds ways7
of evading the controls, moving massive volumes of funds out of the country.  Worse yet,
more often than not, controls on capital outflows have resulted in corruption, as investors
try to move their monies to a “safe haven.”  Moreover, once controls are in place the
authorities usually fail to implement a credible and effective adjustment program.  Quite
on the contrary, once the controls are imposed – or tightened --, the extent of the
macroeconomic disequilibria tends to increase, rather than subsiding. Edwards (1989)
and Edwards and Julio Santaella (1993) analyzed, in great detail, the anatomy of currency
crises in a large number of developing countries.  These studies show that the private
sector found easy ways of circumventing the controls in the months prior to the
devaluation crisis.  In almost 70% of the cases were controls on outflows were used a s a
preventive measure, there was a significant increase in “capital flight” after the controls
had been put in place.  Cuddington (1986) reached a similar conclusion in his study on
the determinants of capital flight in developing countries.  Also, in a large number of the
balance of payments crises analyzed by Kaminsky and Renhart (1999), the authorities
tried, unsuccessfully, to avoid the currency collapse by stepping up controls on capital
outflows.
There is also evidence suggesting that controls on capital outflows may give a
false sense of security, encouraging complacent and careless behavior on behalf of policy
makers and market participants.  The recent currency crisis in Korea is a case in point.
Until quite late in 1997, international analysts and local policy makers believed that, due
to the existence of restrictions on capital mobility, Korea was largely immune to a
currency crisis.  So much so that, after giving the Korean banks and central bank stance
the next to worst ratings, Goldman-Sachs (1997) argued, in its Emerging Markets8
Biweekly, that because Korea had “a relatively closed capital account”, these indicators
should be excluded from the computation of the overall vulnerability index.  As a
consequence, during most of 1997 Goldman-Sachs played down the extent of Korea’s
problems.  If, however, it had (correctly) recognized that capital restrictions cannot truly
protect an economy from financial weaknesses, Goldman would have clearly anticipated
the Korean debacle, as it anticipated the Thai meltdown.  During 1997-98, controls on the
free mobility of capital also gave a false sense of security to Brazilian policy makers.
They repeatedly argued that since short-term capital inflows were restricted, their
currency could not suffer the same fate as the Mexican peso.  As it turned out, they were
wrong.  Once the collapse of the Real became imminent, investors rushed to the door, and
flee the country.
More recently, a second type of controls of capital outflows has gained support
among some academics and policy makers.  Paul Krugman (1998), for example, has argued
that countries already facing a major crisis could benefit from the temporary imposition (or
tightening) of controls on outflows. According to this view, once these “curative” controls
on outflows are in place, the crisis-country can lower interest rates, and put in place pro-
growth policies.  Controlling capital outflows would give crisis countries additional time
to restructure their financial sector in an orderly fashion.  Once the economy is back on
its feet, the argument goes, controls are to be dismantled.  Malaysia followed this path in
1998-99.  And, although it is too early to assess fully the effects of this policy on that
country’s economic performance, preliminary evidence suggests that, contrary to the
fears of orthodox analysts, the temporary controls did not produce much harm.  A skeptic
could argue, however, that Brazil did not tighten controls on outflows after its9
devaluation crisis in January 1999, and that it has experienced – so far – a very strong
recovery.
Naturally, the merits of a particular policy cannot be evaluated on the basis of one
or two historical episodes.  So, what does comparative history tell us about the
effectiveness of this type of post-crisis “curative” capital controls?  Although the
evidence is not fully conclusive, my reading of it is that the imposition (or tightening) of
controls on outflows in post-crisis periods has not been, on average, very helpful.  For
instance, according to the analysis in Edwards (1989), in 50% of the countries that
imposed post-crisis controls, the devaluation was “unsuccessful,” in the sense that it
failed to generate a significant change in the real exchange rate, and failed to improve the
balance of payments.  Furthermore, according to the data compiled in that study, two-
thirds of the countries that enacted post-crisis controls experienced “unsatisfactory” GDP
growth in the period immediately following the currency crisis.  In contrast, only 35% of
the countries that did not restrict outflows after the crisis went through a period of growth
slowdown.
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The 1980s debt crisis provides a recent historical illustration of the working of
controls on capital outflows. Those Latin American countries that stepped-up controls on
capital outflows – Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, to mention just the largest ones–
muddled through, and experienced a long and painful decline in growth, high inflation
and protracted unemployment.  Moreover, the stricter controls on outflows did not
encourage the restructuring of the domestic economies, nor did they result in orderly
reforms.  The opposite, in fact, happened.  In country after country, politicians
experimented with populist policies that encouraged corruption, and that at the end of the10
road deepened the crisis.  Mexico nationalized the banking sector and expropriated
dollar-denominated deposits.  Argentina and Brazil created new currencies, at the same
time as they controlled prices and expanded public expenditure. In Peru, tighter controls
on outflows allowed President Alan Garcia’s administration to systematically erode the
bases of a healthy and productive economy, as the country was rapidly consumed by a
virtual civil war.  Moreover, in none of these countries were controls on capital outflows
successful in slowing down capital flight (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, World Bank
1993).
Controls on Capital Inflows
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, there has been increasing support for the
imposition of controls on capital inflows, as a way of preventing future currency crises
(Eichengreen 1999).  Controls on inflows are expected to protect emerging countries
from international speculation, at the same time as allowing them to undertake an
independent monetary policy.  Some of the countries that have relied on controls on
capital inflows during the last two decades include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech
Republic and Malaysia. It has been Chile’s experience, however, the one that has
attracted the greatest attention from economists, policy advisers and the specialized
media.  It has been argued that by discouraging short-term capital, while still attracting
longer terms funds, Chile’s controls have helped the country achieve a remarkable record
of growth and stability (Massad 1998a, Stiglitz 1999).
How Chile's Controls on Capital Inflows Worked11
Chile has relied on controls on capital inflows on two occasions during the last 20
years: in 1978-82 and, more recently, during 1991-98.  In both episodes, foreigners wishing
to move funds into Chile were required to make non-interest bearing deposits at the Central
Bank.
Controls were first imposed in 1978 when, as a result of massive inflows, the real
exchange rate experienced a large appreciation, and the Central Bank faced increasing
difficulties managing money supply.   This first episode came to an end in 1982 when, as a
consequence of the Latin American debt crisis, capital began to move out of the country.
During this early period (1978-82), the controls were particularly stringent.  Inflows with
maturities below 24 months were prohibited, and those with maturities from 24 to 66
months were subject to reserve requirements that ranged from 10 percent to 25 percent of
the value of the inflows (Edwards and Edwards 1991).   Chile reintroduced restrictions
on capital inflows in June 1991 when, once again, a surge in capital inflows intruded with
macroeconomic policy.  Originally, all portfolio inflows were subject to a 20 percent
reserve deposit that earned no interest.  For maturities of less than a year, the deposit
applied for the duration of the inflow, while for longer maturities, the reserve requirement
was for one year. The private sector quickly found ways of avoiding the controls.  The
most common mechanism was misstating the purpose of the inflow; for instance, short-
term portfolio flows were often labeled as trade credit, or as loans supporting a direct
foreign investment (DFI) project.  In July 1992, the rate of the reserve requirement was
raised to 30 percent, and its holding period was set at one year, independently of the length
of stay of the flow.  Also, at that time, its coverage was extended to trade credit and to
loans related to DFI.  In 1995, and in an effort to close additional loopholes, the controls12
were extended to Chilean stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and to
international bond issues.  In June 1998, to reduce the risk that the capital flows to Chile
would decline as part of contagion from the East Asian financial crisis, the rate of the
reserve requirement was lowered to 10 percent, and in September of that year the rate was
reduced to zero.  Throughout this period Chile also regulated foreign direct investment.
Until 1992, foreign direct investment was subject to a three years minimum stay in the
country; at that time the minimum stay was reduced to one year.  No restrictions exist on
the repatriation of profits from foreign direct investment.
iii
By forcing investors to deposit, at zero interest, a proportion of their funds in the
Central Bank, Chile's system of unremunerated reserve requirements is equivalent to a tax
on capital inflows.  The implicit rate of the tax depends both on the proportion of the
investment that has to be held in reserve, on the length of time the reserve must be held at
the bank, on the length of time the investment funds stay in the country, and on the
opportunity cost of these funds.
iv  Figure 1 contains estimates of this tax-equivalent for
funds that stay in Chile for six months, one year and three years. These calculations are
based on the prevailing reserve requirements each year, and assume that the opportunity
cost of these funds is the interest rate on one-month certificates of deposit in the United
States.  Three aspects of this figure are particularly interesting.  First, the shorter the length
of time that investment funds remain in the country, the higher the implicit tax rate.
Second, the rate of the tax is fairly high – even for longer maturities.  During 1997, for
example, the average tax, even for three-year investments, was 80 basis points.  Third, the
tax equivalent has varied through time, both because the rate of the required deposit was
altered and because the opportunity cost has changed.13
Of course, the implicit tax imposed by capital controls only applies to the extent
that the controls cannot be easily sidestepped.  The discussion has already pointed out
that it is relatively easy for investors to avoid capital controls on outflows, and also on
many kinds of inflows.  In particular, large firms typically have access to international
finance, and thus have the connections and ability to reconfigure their assets in a way that
will circumvent controls on capital inflows or outflows. Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998)
have argued that in spite of the authorities' efforts to close loopholes, Chile's controls
have been subject to considerable evasion.  Cowan and De Gregorio (1997) constructed a
subjective index of the “power” of the controls.  This index takes a value of near one if
the controls are rarely evaded, and takes a value of zero if they are completely evaded.
This index reached its lowest value during the second quarter of 1995; by early 1998, and
after many loopholes had been closed, this index had reached a value of 0.8, still
significantly below one.
The Goals of Chile's Capital Controls
The Chilean authorities had three explicit goals in mind when they passed capital
controls. First, to slow down the volume of capital flowing into the country, and to tilt its
composition towards longer maturities. Second, to reduce (or at least delay) any real
exchange rate appreciation that stemmed from these inflows. And third, to allow Chile's
Central Bank to maintain a high differential between domestic and international interest
rates, and thus to conduct an independent monetary. An additional goal, and one that
follows from these first three, was to reduce the country's vulnerability to international14
financial instability policy (Zahler 1992, Cowan and De Gregorio, 1997; Massad, 1998a;
Valdes-Prieto and Soto, 1996).
The Composition of Capital Inflows in Chile
There is some primae facie evidence that by restricting capital mobility, the Chilean
authorities indeed affected the composition of inflows.  Between 1979 and 1981, when
relatively draconian restrictions on capital inflows were in place, the average maturity of
inflows to Chile was a very long 59 months (Edwards and Edwards 1991).
Table 1 presents data on the composition of capital flowing into Chile between
1988 and 1998.  During this period shorter-term flows -- that is, flows with less than a year
maturity -- declined very steeply relative to longer term capital, and the change in
composition happened immediately after the implementation of the controls on capital
inflows in 1991. Regarding the post-controls period, the data in Table 1 show that, with the
exception of a decline in 1993, the total volume of capital inflows into the country
continued to increase until 1998. In constructing the figures in Table 1, the Central Bank of
Chile, classified inflows as “short term” or “long term” on the basis of contracted maturity.
It is possible to argue, however, that when measuring a country's degree of vulnerability to
financial turmoil what really matters is “residual” maturity, measured by the value of the
stock of the country's liabilities in hands of foreigners that come due within a year.  Figures
on “contractual” and “residual” maturity can, in fact, be very different.  Consider the
following simple example:  assume the case of a county that, every year, receives US$ 100
million in flows with a two-year contractual maturity.  Assume also, that the end of the two
years these funds flow back to their country of origin.  In the steady state, this country’s15
stock of debt is US$200, one half of which (US$200) is due within a year.  In this
hypothetical case, then, from a “contractual” point of view, there are no short- term inflows
(all the funds are coming in for two years), suggesting that the country faces a very low
degree of vulnerability.  However, one half of the stock of debt is due within a year,
making the “residual” maturity equal to 50%.
Table 2 presents data, from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), on residual
maturity for the stock of loans extended by banks in the BIS “Reporting Area,” to Chile
and a group of selected of Latin American and East Asian countries.
v  The results are
revealing.  First, once residual maturity is used, the percentage of short-term debt does not
look as low as when contracting maturities are considered.  Second, the figures in table 2
indicate that in late 1996, before the detonation of the East Asian financial crisis, Chile had
a lower percentage of short-term residual debt to the BIS “Reporting Area” banks than any
of the East Asian countries, with the exception of Malaysia.  Third, although by the end of
1996 Chile had a relatively low percentage of short term residual debt to BIS “Reporting
Area” banks, it was not significantly lower than that of Argentina, a country with no capital
restrictions.  Moreover, this percentage was higher than that of Mexico, another Latin
American country without controls.  Fourth, Chile experienced a significant reduction in its
residual short-term debt to BIS “Reporting Area” banks between 1996 and 1998, just after
the controls were tightened in 1995.
The general picture emerging from Tables 1 and 2 has been confirmed by more
formal analyses.  For example, Soto (1997) and De Gregorio et al. (1998) have used vector16
autoregression analysis on monthly data to analyze the way in which capital controls have
affected the composition of capital inflows.  Their findings suggest that the tax on capital
movements indeed discouraged short-term inflows.  Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) reach a
similar conclusion, although they argue that the controls only became effective in
discouraging short-term flows after 1995, when the implicit rate of taxation imposed by the
controls increased significantly.  These studies also suggest that the reduction in shorter-
term flows was fully compensated by increases in longer- term capital inflows and that,
consequently, aggregate capital moving into Chile was not altered by the controls.
Interestingly enough, these findings are in broad agreement with the results from a
comparative study on the experience of 15 countries during 1990-96, undertaken by
Montiel and Reinhart (1999).
Real Exchange Rates
In December 1989, after 17 years of a military regime, a new government was
democratically elected in Chile. Chile regained access to international financial markets,
and capital began to flow into the country, raising demand for the peso and putting upward
pressure on the real exchange rate.  The newly elected authorities believed that to gain
credibility among international and domestic investors, it was important to obtain the
support of exporters, a group that from the beginning had been behind the market-oriented
reforms program (Labán and Larraín, 1997).  By late 1990, exporters had begun to
complain that the rapid strengthening of the peso in real terms – it had appreciated by more
than 20 % since 1985-- was negatively affecting their ability to compete in international
markets.  As Cowan and De Gregorio (1997, p. 3) write: "[G]rowing concerns [in 1991]17
about inflation and the exchange rate pressure of capital inflows ... led policymakers to
introduce specific capital controls."
During the period when the controls were in effect – April 1991 through September
1998 – the real exchange rate experienced an accumulated appreciation of 28%. 
vi  An
important question is whether the extent of real exchange rate appreciation would have
been greater in the absence of controls on inflows.  Several authors, using different
methodologies and various time periods in the 1990s, have investigated this issue and have
concluded that Chile's capital controls did not affect real exchange rates.  Valdés-Prieto and
Soto (1996) analyzed the relationship between capital controls and the real exchange rate
with an error correction model and concluded that (p. 99) the "reserve requirement does not
affect in any way the long run level of the real exchange rate ... [I]n addition ... these
reserve requirements have an insignificant effect on the real exchange rate in the short run."
Edwards (1999) used monthly data for the period June 1991-September 1998 to estimate a
number of vector autoregressions concerning how changes in the tax on capital inflows
might have affected the real exchange rate. Four endogenous variables were included in the
vector autoregressions: the tax equivalent of the controls, under the assumption that the
funds stay in Chile for 180 days; the change in the log of the bilateral real exchange rate
with respect to the United States; the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate; and
domestic various alternative measures of domestic interest rates.
vii The results showed that
a hike in the tax on capital inflows did not have a significant effect on the real exchange
rate. De Gregorio et al (1998) made an effort to capture the effects of other variables on the
equilibrium real exchange rate.  Their results, obtained from the estimation of an error18
correction model, suggest, once again, that contrary to what the authorities had hoped,
Chile’s controls on capital inflows had no effects on the behavior of the real exchange rate.
Domestic Interest Rates and the Independence of Monetary Policy
Since the mid-1980s, the Chilean Central Bank pursued an anti-inflation policy
based on interest rate targeting. The authorities argued that by maintaining domestic peso-
denominated interest rates above international rates, inflation would decline gradually.
This policy worked relatively well until the late 1980s, when capital inflows to Chile
surged, threatening a rise in domestic inflation. The democratic government of Chile
elected in 1989 thus turned to controls on capital inflows as a tool to allow a persistent gap
between Chilean and world interest rates, which in turn was expected to help the
government's effort to reduce inflation to the lower single-digit level (Zahler 1992).
There is some evidence that Chile's controls on capital inflows were able to affect
domestic interest rates.  However, the magnitude of this effect was rather small.  Analysis
on this point tends to focus on inflation-indexed interest rates, since most financial
transactions in Chile have traditionally been based on such rates.  Using a vector
autoregression specification, Soto (1997) found that a change in the implicit tax on capital
inflows had a positive, very small, short-term effect on indexed interest rates.  My own
calculations, based on the vector autoregression framework sketched in the previous
section and reported in Edwards (1999), suggest that an increase in the tax on capital
inflows will have a positive and small effect on indexed interest rates.  De Gregorio et al
(1998), however, found a somewhat larger effect of the controls on domestic interest rates.19
According to their calculations, if the rate of the reserve requirement is 30%, short-term
interest rates will increase by approximately 140 basis points.
In Edwards (1998b), I argued that if the controls on capital inflows are effective,
then once they are imposed, the differential between dollar and peso interest rates should
rise (after properly adjusting by expected devaluation).  I also argued that once the controls
are in place, it should take longer for interest rate differentials to return to their equilibrium
level.  I tested these propositions by examining the evolution of the interest rate differential
in response to a range of variables and its own value in the previous period. I found out that
the controls had a very small effect on long-term differentials between peso and US Dollar
denominated interest rates.  I found, however, that interest rate differentials became more
sluggish after the imposition of controls -- that is, it took longer for them to reach their
steady state equilibrium.  An important implication of this result is that in the post-controls
period the Central Bank had a greater ability to manipulate domestic interest rates.
All in all, then, the accumulated evidence suggests that the controls on inflows
allowed Chile’s Central Bank to undertake a more independent monetary policy.  The flip
side of this, however, is that by rising domestic interest rates, the controls resulted in a
higher cost of capital to Chilean firms.
Do Controls on Capital Inflows Reduce Financial Instability?
Controls on capital inflows are clearly insufficient to eliminate financial instability.
In spite of Chile's draconian restrictions on capital inflows from 1978-82, Chile went
through a traumatic currency crisis in 1981-82: the peso was devalued by almost 90 percent
and the government had to bail out a large number of banks.  The main cause behind this20
crisis was a poorly regulated banking sector, which used international loans to speculate in
real estate, and that extended large volumes of credit to the owners of the banks.  A
massive banking reform, implemented in 1986, established strict guidelines on banks'
exposure and activities, and instituted a broad system of on-site inspections. This banking
reform has helped Chile withstand the global financial travails of the second half of the
1990s (Edwards and Edwards, 1991; Bosworth, Dornbusch and Laban, 1994).
Surprisingly, to date there have been no in-depth attempts to evaluate formally the
extent to which Chile's capital controls in the 1990s may have helped its financial stability.
In this section I use weekly data to provide a preliminary analysis. Have the controls on
inflows reduced stock market and interest rate volatility in Chile?  Has Chile been at least
somewhat immune from financial "contagion" during the 1990s when the controls have
been in effect?
To analyze the effect of the tax on inflows on Chile’s financial volatility, I
considered a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
framework, which has become standard in financial economics, and is discussed in detail
by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).  This methodology consists of estimating two
equations jointly.  In the first one, the dependent variable is the change in either the
domestic interest rate or (the log of) the stock market index.  The independent variables
include, in principle, a range of variables that affect changes in these financial market
variables, and may include lagged values of interest rates or the stock market index as well.
The error term in this equation, will be expected to have a mean of zero and a time-varying
variance s
2
t.  Thus, this first equation – known as the mean equation -- will be:21
D r t  =  q  + S f j  x t - j  + h t
The second equation to be estimated is the variance equation itself.  It is assumed that the
variance (s
2
t ) depends on lagged squared values of the first equation’s error term, on its
own lagged values, and possibly on other variables (y t – j ).  This second equation – known
as the conditional variance equation -- is:
s
2
t  =  j  + a h
2
t - 1 + b s
2
t - 1 +  S g j  y t - j.
I estimated this two-equation model for changes in the short-term central bank nominal
interest rates (known as the repo rate), and for changes in the logarithm of the stock market
index.  In both cases the data were weekly, covered the longest period for which they are
available, and were obtained from Datastream.
viii  In order to simplify the analysis, I
estimated the mean equations using only lagged values of past interest rates and stock
market prices (respectively) as explanatory variables.
The question at hand is whether the level of variance is reduced by the implicit rate
of tax on capital inflows. Thus, in estimating the equation for the (conditional) variance, the
explanatory variables were the square of the error term in the previous time period, the
variance in the previous time period, and the existing tax rate implied by the capital
controls.
ix  That is, the conditional variance equation that was actually estimated is:
s
2
t  =  j  + a h
2
t - 1 + b s
2
t - 1 +   g   Tax t .22
In particular, the tax level corresponds to the calculations in Figure 1, under the assumption
that the funds stay in the country for 180 days. If the controls on capital inflows have
indeed succeeded in reducing financial volatility, then the coefficient on the tax rate in the
estimated variance equation, should be significantly negative.
The interesting results obtained from the conditional variance equations are
reported in Table 3, for both the interest rate and stock market data. First, this
representation works adequately for both stock market returns and nominal interest rates.
x
Second, the coefficient on the tax variable is negative and significantly different from zero
in the stock market regression; on the other hand, it is not significant in the short-term
interest rate equation.  The fact that the estimated coefficient of  g is significantly negative
is important, and suggests that the policy of restricting capital inflows helped Chile reduce
stock market instability;  interestingly enough, these results also suggest that that policy did
not help reduce short term interest rate volatility.
xi
These results have nothing to say about whether Chile's controls on capital inflows
helped to insulate its economy from contagion stemming from shocks that originated in
other emerging markets.  A particularly interesting issue is whether Chile’s controls on
inflows helped the country to become partially isolated from the financial turmoil that
erupted in east Asia in mid-1997.  To address this issue, I asked whether changes in short
term rates in Chile were affected by changes in short term interest rates in Hong Kong.  The
use of Hong Kong's interest rates as an index of financial instability in East Asia is, of
course, arbitrary.  When alternative indicators are used the results are similar, however.
For the dependent variable, this regression uses the same data on the change in
Chile's short-term nominal interest rates (Dr) as in the previous regression.  The explanatory23
variables are the change in Chile's interest rates in the previous four periods; the change in
the one-month U.S. certificate of deposit rate in the previous four periods (D rUS); the
change in Hong Kong's one-month deposit interest rate in the previous four periods (D
rHK); and the rate of devaluation of the Chilean peso in the previous four time periods (D
dev). The time period is weekly, and the data, which cover the period October 1994
through January 1999, were again obtained from Datastream. The regression is:
D r t  =  q  + S aj  D r t – 1 - j  + S bj  D r
US t – 1 - j  +   S lj  D r
HK  
t – 1 - j  + S jj  D dev  t – 1 - j    + e
t
The sum of the coefficients on the four lags of the Hong Kong interest rate variable are
taken to capture the extent to which Chile has been subject to "contagion" from East Asia
during this period.  An analysis of the data  (including an analysis of a regression’s
residuals) suggested that, approximately in May 1997, there was a break point in the series.
For this reason the equation was estimated for two subperiods: October 1994-May 1997
and May 1997-January 1999.  The results obtained are reported in Table 4.
xii
During the early period, changes in Chile's interest rates were apparently not
affected by changes in interest rates in Hong Kong, which was highly insignificant.  Things
changed, however, during the later period, when according to these estimates, changes in
short-term interest rates in Hong Kong had a positive effect in Chile's short term rate.
Notice that, for the May 1997-September 1998 period, the sum of the estimated coefficients
for Hong-Kong’s interest rates is larger than one, indicating that these shocks were
amplified in Chile. The fact that this transmission took place in spite of the presence of24
capital controls -- and moreover, capital controls which had been specifically tightened
after 1995, as discussed earlier -- suggests that the controls on capital inflows may have
been able to protect Chile from relatively small external shocks, but were not effective in
preventing "contagion" stemming from very large shocks.  Determining the size of shock at
which capital controls come to lose effectiveness is an interesting topic for future research.
Concluding Observation
A number of authors have recently argued that, in order to avoid financial
instability, emerging countries should rely on capital controls.  Two type of controls have
been considered:  controls on capital outflows, and controls on capital inflows.  The
existing historical evidence suggests, quite strongly, that controls on outflows – and, in
particular, quantitative controls on outflows --, have been largely ineffective.  They are
easily circumvented, encourage corruption and, in most historical episodes, have not helped
the adjustment process.  A major drawback of controls on outflows is that, in most cases,
they are not used as a temporary device to face a crisis situation.  Instead, they become a
permanent feature of the country’s incentive structure.
It has been argued that a way of avoiding these problems, and still protecting the
economy from international financial markets’ instability, is by adopting controls on short-
term capital inflows.  If speculative capital cannot come in, the argument goes, then it will
not go out suddenly.  Advocates of this policy have used Chile’s experience between 1991
and 1998, as a successful example of this policy (Eichengreen 1999).
The effectiveness of Chile's controls on capital inflows has often been exaggerated.
Chile's controls did appear to increase the maturity of its foreign debt significantly.25
However, even in 1996 more than 40 percent of Chile's debt to banks in the BIS “Reporting
Area” had a residual maturity of less than one year, and the total volume of aggregate
capital flows moving into Chile during the 1990s did not decline. The controls on inflows
had no significant effect on Chile's real exchange rate, and only a very small effect on
interest rates. There is some preliminary evidence that Chile's capital controls policy helped
reduce stock market instability, also that the controls were unable to isolate Chile from the
very large financial shocks stemming from East Asia in 1997-1999.
Moreover, Chile's capital controls have also had costs.  The most important one is
that they have increased the cost of capital significantly, especially for those small- and
medium-size Chilean firms which find it difficult, or impossible, to evade the controls on
capital inflows. During 1996, for example, the cost of funds for smaller Chilean firms was
as high as 24 percent in pesos; in U.S. dollars, this translated into more than 21 percent per
year.  During 1997, the cost of funds to small firms exceeded 19 percent in dollar terms. A
country considering the adoption of Chile-style controls must compare this higher cost of
capital, especially for small and medium firms, with potential benefits like a reduced
macroeconomic vulnerability to short-term inflows of capital.
Economists have long recognized that cross-border capital movements pose a
difficult policy issue.  In the absence of strong financial supervision in either lending or
borrowing countries, unregulated capital flows may indeed be misallocated, eventually
generating waves of major disruptions in the receiving nations.
Many authors, myself included, have argued that the relaxation of controls on
international capital movements is in order towards the end of a market-oriented reform,
and only after a sound supervisory system for the domestic financial market is in place.26
Controls on capital inflows may sometimes be a partial stop-gap. However, the long-term
solution for a nation concerned with its vulnerability to flows of international capital is for
countries to pursue sound macroeconomic policies, to avoid overly rigid exchange rates,
and to implement banking supervisory systems that reduce moral hazard and corruption.27
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1988 916,564 96.3 34,838 3.7 951,402 --
1989 1,452,595 95.0 77,122 5.0 1,529,717 --
1990 1,683,149 90.3 181,419 9.7 1,864,568 --
1991 521,198 72.7 196,115 27.3 717,313 587
1992 225,197 28.9 554,072 71.1 779,269 11,424
1993 159,462 23.6 515,147 76.4 674,609 41,280
1994 161,575 16.5 819,699 83.5 981,274 87,039
1995 69,675 6.2 1,051,829 93.8 1,121,504 38,752
1996 67,254 3.2 2,042,456 96.8 2,109,710 172,320
1997 81,131 2.8 2,805,882 97.2 2,887,013 331,572
a.  These figures refer to gross foreign capital flowing into Chile each year.
* Deposits in the Banco Chile due to reserve requirements;  short term flows have
a stay of less than one year.34
Table 2: Ratio of Short-term Bank Loans to Total Bank Loans
a
(Percentage)
Mid-1996 End-1996 Mid-1997 End-1997 Mid-1998
Argentina 53.4 56.3 54.2 57.7 57.4
Brazil 57.7 63.0 62.6 64.3 62.6
Chile 57.7 51.2 43.3 50.4 45.9
Colombia 45.9 39.3 39.4 40.0 39.6
Mexico 47.8 44.7 45.5 43.7 44.9
Peru 78.3 79.2 67.0 69.3 75.7
Indonesia 60.0 61.7 59.0 60.6 55.0
Korea 70.8 67.5 68.0 62.8 45.8
Malaysia 49.7 50.3 56.4 52.7 48.6
Taiwan 86.4 84.4 87.3 81.6 80.1
Thailand 68.9 65.2 65.7 65.8 59.3
a.  These figures correspond to the stock of bank loans that are due within a year to banks
in the Bank for International Settlements’ “Reporting Area.”  See text for details.
Source: The Bank for International Settlements.35
Table 3: Financial Market Volatility and Controls on Capital Inflows*
Results from Estimation of Conditional Variance Equation
(GARCH Estimates:  Weekly Data)
Dependent variable: Change in short
term interest rate





















Number of observations 229 385
LM Test
a 4.41 13.86
a.  This is a maximum likelihood test for the presence of heteroskedasticity.
* The figures in parentheses are the t-values.   See text for details.36
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Figure 1:  Tax Equivalent of Capital Controls:
Stay of 180 days, 1 year and 3 years38
ENDNOTES
                                                       
1.  This view was particularly prevalent in Latin America during the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s.  See the discussion and case studies in Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).  See
also John Cuddington (1986).
2.   “Unsatisfactory” growth was defined as a situation where real GDP growth, in that
particular year, was in the lowest quartile for a group of developing countries that
included both crisis and non-crisis countries.  For details see Edwards (1989, Ch. 7)
3.  For further details see Massad (1998a, b), De Greogorio, Edwards and Valdes (1999),
and Budnevich and Lefort (1997).
4.  As shown by Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996) and De  Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes
(1998), the tax equivalent for funds that stay in Chile for k months, is given by the
following expression:
t (k)  =  [ r * l / ( 1 - l ) ] ( r / k),
where r* is an international interest rate that captures the opportunity cost of the reserve
requirement, l  is the proportion of the funds that has to be deposited at the Central Bank,
and r is the period of time (measured in months) that the deposit has to be kept in the
Central Bank.
5. Ideally, one would want to have comparative data on the total stock of national
liabilities in hands of foreigners.  These data, however, are not available for a long-
enough period of time.  The BIS “Reporting Area” is comprised of the Group of Ten
countries plus Austria, Denmark, Finland Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain.  A
somewhat broader coverage can be obtained, for some countries and for a limited period
of time, from the BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank project on debt data (http:/www.imf.org/)
6. It should be mentioned that some authors have found a small transitory effect of Chile's
capital controls on real exchange rates in certain specifications, including Soto (1997) and
De Gregorio et al. (1998).
vii. These data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics and from the Central
Bank of Chile and are available on request.  All the VARs were estimated using two lags.
8.  More specifically, the central bank nominal interest rate is the repo rate, which is the
rate used for short-term transactions with commercial banks.  When other interest rates
were used, the results were similar.
9.  A likelihood ratio test suggests that the residuals of both the interest rates and stock
market equations are subject to heteroskedasticity.  This means that estimating a GARCH
model is appropriate.39
                                                                                                                                                                    
10.  The results for the mean equation are not reported due to space considerations.   For
the case of stock market returns, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of an integrated
(1,1) GARCH.
11.  The LM test reported in the final row of Table 3 is Engle's test for the existence of
residual conditional heteroskedasticity.
12.  These results were obtained using a polynomial distributed lag procedure, that allows
for greater flexibility in the estimated lag structure.